The final thing, as a benchmark, any early stage B2B SaaS company should be looking at net dollar retention well above 100%. This is for several reasons.
First of all, you've probably underpriced your product with your first launch. So you might charge $10,000 a month for your initial customers. You realize pretty quickly that the product could be sold for $20,000 or $30,000. Secondly, you're adding features the whole time. Presumably, you're improving your product. And so that makes it more appealing and customers are willing to pay more money. Thirdly, you should be getting it better at sales and upselling over time as well. It'd be weird if you weren't getting better at that. And so for those three reasons, net dollar retention for early-stage B2B startups should be 125%, 150% would be great, or even higher than that. For mature companies, in the same range, 110%, 120% is pretty good net dollar retention.
If your net dollar retention is below 100%, especially for enterprise B2B SaaS, something is wrong. You are churning off customers. They don't love the product. And I would invest in fixing that, talking to customers and figuring out why they're churning off rather than trying to just shove more customers in the top of the final by investing in sales and marketing, for example. Net dollar retention is absolutely crucial for B2P SaaS companies.
Okay, the second deep dive we're going to do on B2B metrics, and this is applicable to consumer companies as well, is gross margin. Gross margin is your revenue, the money you get from customers, minus the cost of goods sold. So you can imagine that if you're a grocery store, that's most obvious. You're selling sandwiches, for example. The cost of goods sold is the cost of the bread and the cost of the butter and the filling that goes in the sandwich, that's cost of goods sold. For a software company, it's any cost that varies per customer or for each incremental customer you incur more cost.
So let's go back to example we had earlier. We were running an AI customer service bot and you're probably using something like OpenAI or Anthropic to power the core model behind that. And so the cost, the credits that you pay to open AI or Anthropic or someone else is your cost of goods sold. We didn't use to talk about this very much for B2B SaaS companies because the cost of goods was very, very minimal for pure software. It might have been your AWS bill or your bandwidth bill or something like that. It's minimal. And so pure B2B SaaS companies in the past might have had gross margins of 95%. You sell $100 worth of software and it's only $5 of cost. And so people sort of assume it's very, very high margin.
But these days, as software sort of taking over more and more industries, gross margin has become more and more important. So for AI companies today, the gross margin, the amount they pay to open AI or anthropic or others for the foundational model is a really important cost. And by the way, just because you're getting free credits doesn't mean that that's the cost that doesn't exist. It just means you're hiding it for the moment. So companies that hide behind open AI credits and claim that they've got these huge, huge gross margins have a nasty shock coming when those credits run out.
It's also why heavily operational businesses are so tricky. And when a company joins YC with something like a grocery delivery business or really any kind of business where there are a lot of humans involved, a lot of operational processes going along, maybe you paint houses or install heat pumps or something, you have to pay a lot more attention to the gross margin because it's very rare that it's as high as 95%. You might be down at 5, 10, 15% gross margins, which means you have to do a lot more work, get a lot more customers, a lot more revenue to generate the same gross margin. And that gross margin is the thing that they can then pay your head office rent, your engineering salaries, all of those remaining costs that don't vary per customer, but still have to be deducted before you get to profitability.
And so for operationally intensive businesses, we often try to work with founders to see if there's a software-only version of their business that they can run at a much higher margin. So for example, instead of running a delivery company where you have vans and bikes and delivery people, instead can you take the software that powers all of that and sell it to other delivery companies? You're gonna have a, probably a much easier life. Certainly you're gonna have much higher gross margins if you do that.
So in the zero interest rate environment, sort of 2010 to 2021 period, companies were scaling negative margin businesses because capital was so cheap. Famously Uber did this. They used capital as a weapon. So they took these businesses that were initially negative gross margin. That means they're effectively selling $10 worth of service but only charging $9. So losing money on every single order. But trying to get to a sort of a network effect or a tipping point for Uber famously, it was a certain number of drivers, certain density of drivers and riders in a certain city that gets the flywheel going. But when they launched a new city, they didn't have that density, and so they had to subsidize drivers and subsidize riders, which made it a negative gross margin business. And so they raised enormous amounts of capital to expand across the globe before competitors could catch up, but burnt tens of billions of dollars of invested money in doing so.
And that blitz scaling approach, that scaling of negative margin, got popular with founders. And so we saw it in ride sharing, then we saw it in 10-minute grocery delivery, we saw it with electric scooters. And honestly, there's like a whole wasteland of startups that tried to do that and then realized they couldn't continue to raise money as investors just didn't want to keep subsidizing these businesses. And certainly now, with much higher interest rates, capital has become much more expensive. Investors are really, really low to invest in negative margin businesses. It's much, much harder to scale those negative margins.
We did this at Monzo. Monzo was an online bank in the UK, and for our first half million customers or so, we were losing money on every customer. 30 or 40 pounds per customer. We scaled to more than half a million of those customers. It costs a lot. But we had a plan to turn it around. So we brought technology in-house. We didn't rely so much on external vendors. We introduced charges for certain things. We introduced new products that customers were happy to pay for. And over time, we flipped those negative unit economics. So rather than losing 30 or 40 pounds per customer we ended up, when I was there, making 30 or 40 pounds per customer. And now three or four years later, Monza's profitable.
So if you start with negative unit economics, you really, really have to have a plan to fix them. And I would really advise you don't scale your customer base. You don't try and grow as quickly as possible whilst you have negative unit economics. You fix them first, and then you scale.
We covered a lot of stuff today. So as a recap, we talked about revenue and why it's the best core metric for most B2B companies. Then we talked about retention and its fancy cousin net dollar retention and why having a net dollar retention above 100% is so important for B2B startups. And we finished with gross margin and why it's so important not to scale businesses with negative gross margins.